Crisis, Rationality, and Institutions: How Communities Cope with Unpleasant Surprises without Collapsing
38 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2012 Last revised: 26 Apr 2012
Date Written: April 25, 2012
Abstract
This paper develops a model of crisis and collapse, which is used to analyze the relative survivability of communities with alternative political institutions. The analysis suggests that communities with relatively democratic, decentralized, and flexible crisis managemen systems tend to do better than those with rigid, centralized crisis management systems because they are less likely to deplete the social reserves necessary for survival in the long run. Existential problems examined include both natural shocks and policy mistakes.
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