Crisis, Rationality, and Institutions: How Communities Cope with Unpleasant Surprises without Collapsing

38 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2012 Last revised: 26 Apr 2012

See all articles by Roger D. Congleton

Roger D. Congleton

West Virginia University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice

Date Written: April 25, 2012

Abstract

This paper develops a model of crisis and collapse, which is used to analyze the relative survivability of communities with alternative political institutions. The analysis suggests that communities with relatively democratic, decentralized, and flexible crisis managemen systems tend to do better than those with rigid, centralized crisis management systems because they are less likely to deplete the social reserves necessary for survival in the long run. Existential problems examined include both natural shocks and policy mistakes.

Suggested Citation

Congleton, Roger D., Crisis, Rationality, and Institutions: How Communities Cope with Unpleasant Surprises without Collapsing (April 25, 2012). PERC Research Paper No. 12/6, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2041617 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2041617

Roger D. Congleton (Contact Author)

West Virginia University - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States

HOME PAGE: http://rdc1.net

George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rdc1.net

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