Transparency Soup: The ACTA Negotiating Process and ‘Black Box’ Lawmaking

American University International Law Review, 2011

Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property (PIJIP) Research Paper Series

27 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2011 Last revised: 5 May 2012

See all articles by David S. Levine

David S. Levine

Elon University School of Law; Stanford University - Center for Internet and Society

Date Written: February 8, 2011

Abstract

The negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) have been marred by a level of attempted secrecy heretofore unseen in international intellectual property lawmaking. Simultaneously, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has been used in several significant national contexts to prevent the disclosure of data and information in ways that call into question its efficacy as an effective regulation of governmental knowledge. This paper seeks to tie together these two recent developments in order to (a) prevent future international intellectual property law negotiations from being unduly secret and (b) encourage Congress to consider reforming FOIA in light of current public expectations and technological capabilities for transparency and accountability.

Keywords: ACTA, BP, Corexit, TARP, Transparency, Accountability

Suggested Citation

Levine, David S., Transparency Soup: The ACTA Negotiating Process and ‘Black Box’ Lawmaking (February 8, 2011). American University International Law Review, 2011, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property (PIJIP) Research Paper Series, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1763483

David S. Levine (Contact Author)

Elon University School of Law ( email )

201 N. Greene Street
Greensboro, NC 27401
United States

HOME PAGE: http://hearsayculture.com

Stanford University - Center for Internet and Society ( email )

Palo Alto, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blogs/levine/

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