Inferring Strategic Voting
50 Pages Posted: 13 May 2009 Last revised: 5 May 2012
Date Written: April 17, 2012
Abstract
We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [63.4%, 84.9%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction [1.4%, 4.2%] of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.
Keywords: strategic voting, set estimation, partially identified models, discrete choice models
JEL Classification: D7, H8
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
By Daniel Diermeier, Michael P. Keane, ...
-
By Francesco Caselli and Massimo Morelli
-
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers, Second Version
By Daniel Diermeier, Michael P. Keane, ...
-
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers: Supplementary Material
By Daniel Diermeier, Michael P. Keane, ...
-
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate
-
By Matthias Messner and Mattias Polborn
-
Political Careers or Career Politicians?
By Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo
-
Political Careers or Career Politicians?
By Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo
-
Political Careers or Career Politicians?
By Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo
-
Political Careers Or Career Politicians? Second Version
By Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo