Information Sharing and the Volume of Private Credit in Transition: Evidence from Ukrainian Bank-Level Panel Data

43 Pages Posted: 29 May 2011 Last revised: 11 Jun 2012

See all articles by Peter Grajzl

Peter Grajzl

Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics; CESifo

Nataliia Laptieva

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: June 10, 2012

Abstract

The effect of lenders' information sharing on the volume of credit is ambiguous in theory and underexplored empirically. Departing from the scant existing literature, which draws on country-level aggregate data, we study the impact of information sharing on the volume of private credit by examining unique bank-level panel data from Ukraine, a transition economy where information sharing among banks is only a recent phenomenon. Employing the fixed-effects framework and dynamic panel methods to address endogeneity due to the non-exogenous nature of banks' choice to participate in information sharing, we find no credit volume effect of information sharing when information sharing takes place through the central bank-administered public credit registry. In contrast, information sharing through private credit bureaus is associated with an increase in the volume of bank lending, in particular when a bank is partner of multiple private credit bureaus. This effect is robust and non-negligible in magnitude.

Keywords: Information sharing, bank lending, transition, panel data

JEL Classification: G21, G28, P34, O16

Suggested Citation

Grajzl, Peter and Laptieva, Nataliia, Information Sharing and the Volume of Private Credit in Transition: Evidence from Ukrainian Bank-Level Panel Data (June 10, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1854663 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1854663

Peter Grajzl (Contact Author)

Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics ( email )

Lexington, VA 24450
United States

HOME PAGE: http://home.wlu.edu/~grajzlp/

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Nataliia Laptieva

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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