Repeated Nash Implementation

38 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2012

See all articles by Claudio Mezzetti

Claudio Mezzetti

University of Warwick - Faculty of Social Studies

Ludovic Renou

Queen Mary University of London

Date Written: June 29, 2012

Abstract

This paper studies repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We introduce the condition of dynamic monotonicity and show that it is necessary for repeated implementation in finite as well as infinite horizon problems. With at least three agents, the conditions of dynamic monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient. In infinite horizon problems with high enough discount factors, dynamic monotonicity implies weak efficiency in the range (Lee and Sabourian, 2011), while Maskin monotonicity implies dynamic monotonicity in finite horizon problems.

Keywords: Dynamic Monotonicity, Nash Implementation, Maskin Monotonicity, Repeated Implementation, Repeated Games

JEL Classification: C72, D71

Suggested Citation

Mezzetti, Claudio and Renou, Ludovic, Repeated Nash Implementation (June 29, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2096184 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2096184

Claudio Mezzetti

University of Warwick - Faculty of Social Studies ( email )

United Kingdom

Ludovic Renou (Contact Author)

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
London, London E1 4NS
United Kingdom

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