Voters Elect Politicians Who Closely Matched Their Preferences

7 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2012

See all articles by Marco Portmann

Marco Portmann

University of Fribourg - Faculty of Economics and Social Science

David Stadelmann

University of Bayreuth - Faculty of Law, Business and Economics; CREMA

Reiner Eichenberger

University of Fribourg - Faculty of Economics and Social Science; CREMA

Date Written: July 23, 2012

Abstract

What determines political candidates' election prospects? We match roll call votes of candidates for the majority elected upper house of parliament who were previously in in the lower house with revealed preferences of their constituency. Thereby, we obtain a direct measure of past congruence. Politicians have a significantly and quantitatively important higher probability of election when they more closely matched the preferences of their constituency. This provides evidence for the direct retrospective voting rule that voters elect politicians who represented their preferences well.

Keywords: Retrospective Voting, Voting Behavior, Representation, Constituents' Preferences

JEL Classification: D72, D70

Suggested Citation

Portmann, Marco and Stadelmann, David and Eichenberger, Reiner, Voters Elect Politicians Who Closely Matched Their Preferences (July 23, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2115362 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2115362

Marco Portmann

University of Fribourg - Faculty of Economics and Social Science ( email )

Fribourg, CH 1700
Switzerland

David Stadelmann (Contact Author)

University of Bayreuth - Faculty of Law, Business and Economics ( email )

Universitätsstraße 30
Bayreuth, 95447
Germany

CREMA ( email )

Gellertstrasse 18
Basel
Zurich, CH 8006
Switzerland

Reiner Eichenberger

University of Fribourg - Faculty of Economics and Social Science ( email )

Fribourg, CH 1700
Switzerland

CREMA ( email )

Gellertstrasse 18
Basel
Zurich, CH 8006
Switzerland

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
79
Abstract Views
754
Rank
555,601
PlumX Metrics