Codes of Conduct, Private Information, and Repeated Games
FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2012-031A
34 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2012
Date Written: August 13, 2012
Abstract
We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent’s intentions. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s code-of-conduct, and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting. Using both sources of information we are able to prove a “folk-like” theorem for repeated self-referential games with private information. This theorem holds even when both sources of information are weak.
Keywords: repeated game, folk theorem, self-referential game, approximate equilibrium
JEL Classification: D01, D03, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation