Codes of Conduct, Private Information, and Repeated Games

FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2012-031A

34 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2012

See all articles by Juan Block

Juan Block

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics

David K. Levine

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 13, 2012

Abstract

We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent’s intentions. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s code-of-conduct, and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting. Using both sources of information we are able to prove a “folk-like” theorem for repeated self-referential games with private information. This theorem holds even when both sources of information are weak.

Keywords: repeated game, folk theorem, self-referential game, approximate equilibrium

JEL Classification: D01, D03, D82

Suggested Citation

Block, Juan and Levine, David K. and Levine, David K., Codes of Conduct, Private Information, and Repeated Games (August 13, 2012). FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2012-031A, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2149170 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2149170

Juan Block

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.juanblock.com/

David K. Levine (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

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