The Consolidation of Financial Regulation: Pros, Cons, and Implications for the United States

FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly, vol. 95, no. 2, Spring 2009, pp. 121-160

40 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2012

See all articles by Sabrina Pellerin

Sabrina Pellerin

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

John R. Walter

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Patricia Wescott

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

The U.S. financial system has changed significantly over the last several decades without any major structural changes to the decentralized financial regulatory system, despite numerous proposals. In the past decade, many countries have chosen to consolidate their regulators into a newly formed "single regulator" or have significantly reduced the number of existing regulators in order to form a regulatory structure that more closely mirrors the current financial system -- one that is increasingly dominated by large financial conglomerates. This paper reviews the advantages and disadvantages of regulatory consolidation, explores the effects of consolidation on regulators' incentives, and evaluates which entity is best suited for this role -- whether it be a newly created entity or an existing one, such as a central bank. Additionally, this paper reviews the transitions to consolidated regulation that took place in the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Australia and finds that despite significant consolidation, complex systems with multiple entities remain. These countries removed most regulatory authority from their central banks, yet there may be reasons not to make such a change.

Suggested Citation

Pellerin, Sabrina and Walter, John R. and Wescott, Patricia, The Consolidation of Financial Regulation: Pros, Cons, and Implications for the United States (2009). FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly, vol. 95, no. 2, Spring 2009, pp. 121-160, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2188499

Sabrina Pellerin

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond ( email )

P.O. Box 27622
Richmond, VA 23261
United States

John R. Walter (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond ( email )

P.O. Box 27622
Richmond, VA 23261
United States

Patricia Wescott

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond ( email )

P.O. Box 27622
Richmond, VA 23261
United States

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