Deterrence Theory and the Corporate Criminal Actor: Professor Utset's Fresh Take on an Old Problem

Virginia Journal of Criminal Law, Forthcoming

Northeastern University School of Law Research Paper No. 127-2013

5 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2013 Last revised: 21 Feb 2013

See all articles by Daniel S. Medwed

Daniel S. Medwed

Northeastern University - School of Law

Date Written: February 16, 2013

Abstract

This essay comments on Professor Manuel Utset's latest work in the area of corporate criminal conduct and time-consistent preferences. The essay praises Professor Utset for developing a strong theoretical basis for justifying the external regulation of corporate actors, but also addresses another implication of his theory -- that it has salience in warranting greater internal regulation as well.

Suggested Citation

Medwed, Daniel S., Deterrence Theory and the Corporate Criminal Actor: Professor Utset's Fresh Take on an Old Problem (February 16, 2013). Virginia Journal of Criminal Law, Forthcoming, Northeastern University School of Law Research Paper No. 127-2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2219327

Daniel S. Medwed (Contact Author)

Northeastern University - School of Law ( email )

416 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
United States

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