Better Safe than Sorry: How Property Rights and Veto Players Jointly Affect Economic Growth

37 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2012 Last revised: 28 Feb 2013

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

A growing literature argues that division of powers matter for economic growth by increasing the security of property rights. However, less effort has been devoted to examining the political and institutional conditions under which property rights have economic effects. This paper emphasizes that the economic effects of property rights depend on the division of powers between veto players, meaning that the interaction of veto players and property rights matters for economic growth. This argument is tested empirically on a panel of developing countries. The results show that the economic effects of property rights increase significantly as power sharing between veto players increases. This suggests that property rights matter mainly in the context of institutions dividing political powers between veto players.

Keywords: Property rights, economic growth, veto players, separation of powers, political institutions

JEL Classification: O1, P14, P16

Suggested Citation

Justesen, Mogens K., Better Safe than Sorry: How Property Rights and Veto Players Jointly Affect Economic Growth (2012). APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2105389

Mogens K. Justesen (Contact Author)

Copenhagen Business School ( email )

Department of Business and Politics
Porcelænshaven 1
Frederiksberg C, DK - 2000
Denmark

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
102
Abstract Views
791
Rank
472,796
PlumX Metrics