Competing for the Crown: Rebel Group Competition and Civilian Victimization in Civil War

33 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2013

See all articles by Reed M. Wood

Reed M. Wood

Department of Government, University of Essex; Department of Government, University of Essex

Jacob D. Kathman

University of Mississippi

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

Recent analyses demonstrate that inter-group dynamics among rebels have important implications for conflict processes. Fragmentation, factionalism, and competition among independent non-state actor organizations shape the strategies adopted by states and rebel factions as well as conflict outcomes. We expand on this literature by examining the influence of competition among rebel groups on civilian victimization. We argue that volatility within a conflict system contributes to an increase in civilian targeting by rebel groups. More specifically, the likelihood of a given rebel group victimizing civilians is partly a function of threat to the group’s access to necessary conflict resources, including civilian support, trade in lucrative commodities, and control of territory. The emergence of rival challengers represents a threat to the existing group’s market share within the conflict system. The “shock” created by the entry of new actors as well as the decline in market share the new group produces temporary increases in civilian targeting. We evaluate hypotheses drawn from this argument using monthly conflict events data for a sample of African civil conflicts between 1989 and 2008. The results of the regression analyses support these hypotheses.

Suggested Citation

Wood, Reed M. and Kathman, Jacob D., Competing for the Crown: Rebel Group Competition and Civilian Victimization in Civil War (2013). APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper, American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2300128

Reed M. Wood (Contact Author)

Department of Government, University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

Department of Government, University of Essex ( email )

United Kingdom

Jacob D. Kathman

University of Mississippi ( email )

Oxford, MS 38677
United States

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