The Costs of Freedom: New Institutional Comparison of China's and the U.S.'s Responses to the Financial Collapse
Oregon Review of International Law, Vol. 15, pp. 101-138, 2013
38 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2013
Date Written: April 15, 2012
Abstract
Starting with the framework of New Institutional Economics, this Comment examines the institutional arrangements of Chinese and U.S. governance, and then scrutinizes their respective policy responses to the financial collapse of 2008. The latent thesis is that, notwithstanding differences in economic development, the more centralized arrangement of China allowed for a more timely and competent response, while the comparatively more decentralized arrangement of the U.S. resulted in languid and ineffective measures, themselves punctuated by political brinksmanship. The Comment concludes that the Chinese institutional arrangement should, by virtue of design, produce a more timely and internally consistent response than the U.S., but at the expense of individual liberty.
Keywords: China, fiscal collapse, stimulus, New Institutional Economics, U.S., transaction cost economics, international economics
JEL Classification: F33, F34, G18, H60, L14, L16, L22, N10, N20, N40, P16, P26, P51
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation