The Politics of Anti-Dumping in Dispute Settlement: The Trade Predator's Constant Dilemma
29 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2013
Date Written: October 29, 2013
Abstract
While countries continue to negotiate new mega free trade agreements in the EU and the US, they increasingly rely on anti-dumping laws to protect their industries from predatory pricing and the high costs of global structural change. Legally sanctioned protectionism has become a prominent feature of international trade at a time of intense globalization despite the expert advice of lawyers and economists to shut it down. Anti-dumping investigations before national tribunals have long been a right of governments to insulate their economies against highly volatile conditions in the international environment that distort the normal practices of a world trading system. The paper provides an empirical overview of anti-dumping measures from 1994-2011, anti-dumping initiatives north v. south and south-south and the targeting of China’s many export industries.
Keywords: WTO anti-dumping code, disguised protection, globalization, structural adjustment, industrial policy, WTO dispute resolution
JEL Classification: A12, A14, B25, D63, E24, L21, L12, K33
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