The Politics of Anti-Dumping in Dispute Settlement: The Trade Predator's Constant Dilemma

29 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2013

Date Written: October 29, 2013

Abstract

While countries continue to negotiate new mega free trade agreements in the EU and the US, they increasingly rely on anti-dumping laws to protect their industries from predatory pricing and the high costs of global structural change. Legally sanctioned protectionism has become a prominent feature of international trade at a time of intense globalization despite the expert advice of lawyers and economists to shut it down. Anti-dumping investigations before national tribunals have long been a right of governments to insulate their economies against highly volatile conditions in the international environment that distort the normal practices of a world trading system. The paper provides an empirical overview of anti-dumping measures from 1994-2011, anti-dumping initiatives north v. south and south-south and the targeting of China’s many export industries.

Keywords: WTO anti-dumping code, disguised protection, globalization, structural adjustment, industrial policy, WTO dispute resolution

JEL Classification: A12, A14, B25, D63, E24, L21, L12, K33

Suggested Citation

Drache, Daniel, The Politics of Anti-Dumping in Dispute Settlement: The Trade Predator's Constant Dilemma (October 29, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2361473 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2361473

Daniel Drache (Contact Author)

York University ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies
Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3
Canada
416.450.0100 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.danieldrache.com

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