Behaviorally Rational Expectations and Almost Self-Fulfilling Equilibria

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 13-204/II

30 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2013

See all articles by Cars H. Hommes

Cars H. Hommes

Government of Canada - Bank of Canada; CeNDEF, Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: August 19, 2013

Abstract

Rational expectations assumes perfect, model consistency between beliefs and market realizations. Here we discuss behaviorally rational expectations, characterized by an observable, parsimonious and intuitive form of consistency between beliefs and realizations. We discuss three case-studies. Firstly, a New Keynesian macro model with a representative agent learning an optimal, but misspecified, AR(1) rule to forecast inflation consistent with observed sample mean and first-order autocorrelations. Secondly, an asset pricing model with heterogeneous expectations and agents switching between a mean-reverting fundamental rule and a trend-following rule, based upon their past performance.

The third example concerns learning-to-forecast laboratory experiments, where under positive feedback individuals coordinate expectations on non-rational, almost self-fulfilling equilibria with persistent price fluctuations very different from rational equilibria.

Keywords: expectation feedback, self-fulfilling beliefs, heuristic switching model, experimental economics

JEL Classification: D84, D83, E32, C92

Suggested Citation

Hommes, Cars H., Behaviorally Rational Expectations and Almost Self-Fulfilling Equilibria (August 19, 2013). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 13-204/II, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2369805 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2369805

Cars H. Hommes (Contact Author)

Government of Canada - Bank of Canada ( email )

234 Wellington Street
Ontario, Ottawa K1A 0G9
Canada

CeNDEF, Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, NL-1018WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uva.nl/en/profile/h/o/c.h.hommes/c.h.hommes.html

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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