Understanding Long-Term Japanese Government Bonds’ Low Nominal Yields

16 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2014

See all articles by Tanweer Akram

Tanweer Akram

Citibank

Anupam Das

Mount Royal University - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 30, 2013

Abstract

During the past two decades chronic fiscal deficits have led to elevated and rising ratios of government debt to nominal GDP in Japan. Nevertheless long-term Japanese government bonds’ (JGBs) nominal yields initially declined and since then have stayed remarkably low and stable. This is contrary to the received wisdom of the existing literature which holds that higher government deficits and indebtedness shall exert upward pressures on nominal yields. This paper examines the relationship between JGBs’ nominal yields and short-term interest rates and other factors, such as low inflation and persistent deflationary pressures and tepid growth. It is also argued that Japan has monetary sovereignty, which gives the Government of Japan the ability to service its debt and enables the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to keep JGBs’ nominal yields low by ensuring that short-term interest rates are low and by using various other tools of monetary policy. The argument that short-term interest rates and monetary policy are the primarily drivers of long-term interest rates follows Keynes’s (1930) insights.

Keywords: Japanese government bonds, nominal bond yields, long-term interest rates, short-term interest rates, monetary sovereignty

JEL Classification: E43, E50, E60

Suggested Citation

Akram, Tanweer and Das, Anupam, Understanding Long-Term Japanese Government Bonds’ Low Nominal Yields (December 30, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2373228 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2373228

Tanweer Akram (Contact Author)

Citibank ( email )

Irving, TX 75039

Anupam Das

Mount Royal University - Department of Economics ( email )

4825 Mount Royal Gate SW
Calgary, T3E 6K6
Canada

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