Buying and Selling Risk -- An Experiment Investigating Evaluation Asymmetries

31 Pages Posted: 5 Feb 2014

See all articles by Werner Güth

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

Matteo Ploner

University of Trento - Department of Economics and Management; University of Trento

Ivan Soraperra

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics

Date Written: January 30, 2014

Abstract

Experimental studies of the WTP-WTA gap avoid social trading by implementing an incentive compatible mechanism for each individual trader. We compare a traditional random price mechanism and a novel elicitation mechanism preserving social trading, without sacrificing mutual incentive compatibility. Furthermore, we focus on risky goods -- binary monetary lotteries -- for which asymmetries in evaluations are more robust with respect to experimental procedures. For both elicitation mechanisms, the usual asymmetry in evaluation by sellers and buyers is observed. An econometric estimation sheds new light on its causes: potential buyers are over-pessimistic and systematically underweight the probability of a good outcome.

Keywords: WTP-WTA gap, risk, elicitation mechanisms, probability weighting

JEL Classification: D810

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Ploner, Matteo and Ploner, Matteo and Soraperra, Ivan, Buying and Selling Risk -- An Experiment Investigating Evaluation Asymmetries (January 30, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4575, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2390586 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2390586

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Matteo Ploner (Contact Author)

University of Trento ( email )

Via Giuseppe Verdi 26
Trento, Trento 38152
Italy

University of Trento - Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Via Inama 5
Trento, I-38100
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www4.unitn.it/People/en/Web/Persona/PER0000996

Ivan Soraperra

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics

Jena
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
60
Abstract Views
952
Rank
640,387
PlumX Metrics