The Strategy of Manipulating Joint Decision-Making
10 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2013 Last revised: 14 Oct 2014
Date Written: January 21, 2014
Abstract
We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers' joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers' value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the better outside option is critical in determining whether communication is truthful, overselling, or ineffective.
Keywords: Collective decision-making, Communication, Information
JEL Classification: C72, D70, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kim, Jin Yeub and Kwon, Heung Jin, The Strategy of Manipulating Joint Decision-Making (January 21, 2014). Economics Letters, Vol. 123, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2331076 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2331076
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