Bracelets of Pride and Guilt? An Experimental Test of Self-Signaling in Charitable Giving

24 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2014

See all articles by Joel J. van der Weele

Joel J. van der Weele

University of Amsterdam - Center for Experimental Economics and political Decision making (CREED); Tinbergen Institute; Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Ferdinand von Siemens

Goethe University Frankfurt; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: February 25, 2014

Abstract

Self-signaling theory argues that individuals partly behave prosocially to create or uphold a favorable self-image. To study self-signaling theory, we investigate whether increasing self-image concerns affects charitable giving. In our experiment subjects divide 20 euros between themselves and a charity. Some randomly determined participants are induced to wear a bracelet for the two weeks following their donation decision. This bracelet serves as a private reminder of the experiment, thus making the donation more important for future self-image. If self-signaling plays a role, participants having to wear the bracelet should donate more. We do not find that wearing a bracelet has any effect on donation behavior. This holds although subjects having to wear the bracelet report that at the moment of making the donation, they expect to more often remember the experiment in the following two weeks.

Keywords: self-signaling, dictator games, charitable giving

JEL Classification: C910, C720, D830

Suggested Citation

van der Weele, Joel J. and von Siemens, Ferdinand, Bracelets of Pride and Guilt? An Experimental Test of Self-Signaling in Charitable Giving (February 25, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4674, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2411441 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2411441

Joel J. Van der Weele

University of Amsterdam - Center for Experimental Economics and political Decision making (CREED) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/joelvdweele/

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Center for Financial Studies (CFS) ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Ferdinand Von Siemens (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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