Attribution Error in Economic Voting: Evidence From Trade Shocks

41 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2014

See all articles by Masami Imai

Masami Imai

Wesleyan University

Cameron A. Shelton

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance

Rosa Hayes

Emmett Environmental Law & Policy Clinic, Harvard Law School

Date Written: March 2014

Abstract

This paper exploits the international transmission of business cycles to examine the prevalence of attribution error in economic voting in a large panel of countries from 1990-2009. We find that voters, on average, exhibit a strong tendency to oust incumbent governments during an economic downturn, regardless of whether the recession is home-grown or merely imported from trading partners. However, we find important heterogeneity in the extent of attribution error. A split sample analysis shows that countries with more experienced voters, more educated voters, and possibly more informed voters — all conditions which have been shown to mitigate other voter agency problems — do better in distinguishing imported from domestic growth.

Keywords: economic voting, political agency problem

JEL Classification: E3, E6

Suggested Citation

Imai, Masami and Shelton, Cameron A. and Hayes, Rosa, Attribution Error in Economic Voting: Evidence From Trade Shocks (March 2014). Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER) Paper No. E-73, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2416722

Masami Imai (Contact Author)

Wesleyan University ( email )

Middletown, CT 06459
United States
860-685-2155 (Phone)

Cameron A. Shelton

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )

500 E. Ninth St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States

Rosa Hayes

Emmett Environmental Law & Policy Clinic, Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
51
Abstract Views
661
Rank
693,387
PlumX Metrics