Getting There is Half the Battle: Military Mobilization and the Escalation of Demands

Paper presented at the 2014 Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting.

21 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2014

Date Written: April 6, 2014

Abstract

When a state in a diplomatic crisis with a rival mobilizes its military, it pays in advance some of the costs of fighting a war since military movements are a necessary first step in actually fighting. However, this act of sinking costs during negotiation alters the bargaining environment. This is because the set of possible negotiated outcomes mutually-preferred to war is determined by the joint costs of war, and part of the cost of war includes mobilization. Mobilization reduces the remaining marginal cost of war for the mobilizing side, thereby raising the mobilizer’s minimum demands for a negotiated settlement. Case studies of British mobilization in the Crimean War and U.S. mobilization against Iraq prior to March 2003 demonstrate the effect of mobilization on the course of negotiations. We conclude with some implications for the credibility of great powers who mobilize against distant weaker states.

Keywords: bargaining, war, mobilization, Crimean War, Iraq War

Suggested Citation

Macomber, Christopher and Rector, Chad, Getting There is Half the Battle: Military Mobilization and the Escalation of Demands (April 6, 2014). Paper presented at the 2014 Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2420950 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2420950

Christopher Macomber

Marymount University (VA) ( email )

2807 N. Glebe Rd
Arlington, VA 22207-4299
United States

Chad Rector (Contact Author)

Marymount University ( email )

2807 N. Globe Rd
Arlington, VA 22207-4299
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.chadrector.net

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