The WTO Consistency of the European Union Timber Regulation

Journal of World Trade 48:2, pp.433-456, April 2014

KU Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper No. 120

29 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2014

See all articles by Dylan Geraets

Dylan Geraets

KU Leuven; KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies

Bregt Natens

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies

Date Written: September 2013

Abstract

The Timber Regulation is the EU’s latest addition to its regulatory framework on forestry governance. This paper begins with an overview of the substantive provisions of the Regulation and then briefly addresses two comparable initiatives: the American Lacey Act and the Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill. The second part of the paper focuses extensively on the WTO consistency of the Regulation, based on an analysis of Articles XI, III, and I GATT. In the view of the authors, although the EU Timber Regulation is likely to violate at least one substantive WTO provision, it is probably justifiable on the basis of Article XX GATT. The approach taken in the Timber Regulation may serve the EU in achieving non-trade objectives by restricting access to its market.

Keywords: EUTR, EU Timber Regulation, Lacey Act, Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Geraets, Dylan and Natens, Bregt, The WTO Consistency of the European Union Timber Regulation (September 2013). Journal of World Trade 48:2, pp.433-456, April 2014, KU Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper No. 120, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2430415

Dylan Geraets

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Bus 5005 3000
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant B-3000
Belgium

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies ( email )

Van Evenstraat 2B
Charles Deberiotstraat 34
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Bregt Natens (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies ( email )

Charles Deberiotstraat 34
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

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