Web Extension for: The Effect of National Revenues on Sub-National Revenues: Evidence from the U.S.

5 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2013 Last revised: 30 Apr 2014

See all articles by Brian D. Galle

Brian D. Galle

Georgetown University Law Center

Date Written: April 25, 2014

Abstract

I present for the first time an empirical examination of the impact of total federal revenues on total sub-national proceeds. Prior theory recognizes that the effects of national revenues on sub-national revenue-raising are ambiguous. Earlier studies have focused on vertical relationships between particular tax bases, such as the impact of federal commodity taxes on state or provincial commodity tax rates. Using a panel of data from U.S. states over the recent decade, I find an economically and statistically significant degree of federal crowding in of state revenues. I note the potential implications of these results for fiscal federalism theory and legal controversies over federal conditional spending.

For copyright reasons, only the abstract of the full article is freely available online. This brief web appendix provides results for 2SLS robustness checks omitted from the published edition. Interested readers may contact the author for the full article.

Keywords: fiscal federalism, vertical tax competition, vertical fiscal externalities, conditional spending, state and local tax deduction

JEL Classification: H11, H71, H77, K39

Suggested Citation

Galle, Brian D., Web Extension for: The Effect of National Revenues on Sub-National Revenues: Evidence from the U.S. (April 25, 2014). 37 International Review of Law and Economics 147, Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 282, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2210024 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2210024

Brian D. Galle (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

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