Party Autonomy in International Family Law: A Note from an Economic Perspective

22 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2013 Last revised: 13 Oct 2020

See all articles by Paul Jurcys

Paul Jurcys

Prifina; Vilnius University - Faculty of Law

Mark Fenwick

Kyushu University - Graduate School of Law

Date Written: July 15, 2013

Abstract

This paper aims to contribute to the discussion concerning the scope of party autonomy in international family law. It is suggested to adopt a wider view and analyse the principle of party autonomy from the efficiency perspective. In particular, this short note questions the widely accepted assumption that agreements in family law are very similar, if not identical, to other forms of market transactions. In order to facilitate the debate, it is suggested to take into consideration that some forms of agreements perform signaling function and therefore should be treated differently from other forms of market transactions. It is argued that such a perspective could help identify the surplus value of the agreement. The paper concludes with some further thoughts about the implications of the signaling and surplus value to the discussion on party autonomy in international family law.

Keywords: party autonomy, private international law, conflict of laws, law and economics, efficiency, family law, signaling

JEL Classification: A12, A13, D60, D61, D62, D63, K0, K10, K12

Suggested Citation

Jurcys, Paul and Fenwick, Mark, Party Autonomy in International Family Law: A Note from an Economic Perspective (July 15, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2127081 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2127081

Paul Jurcys (Contact Author)

Prifina ( email )

1 Market Street
San Francisco, CA California 94105
United States

Vilnius University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Saulėtekio ave. 9, building I
Vilnius, LT-10222
Lithuania

Mark Fenwick

Kyushu University - Graduate School of Law ( email )

744 Motooka, Nishi-ku,
Fukuoka, Fukuoka 819-0395
Japan

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