Attacks on Public-Sector Bargaining as Attacks on Employee Voice: A (Partial) Defence of the Wagner Act Model

50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 875 (2013)

University of Toledo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-15

29 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2014

See all articles by Joseph E. Slater

Joseph E. Slater

University of Toledo College of Law

Date Written: September 1, 2013

Abstract

The attacks on public-sector union rights in the United States that began in 2011 are one of the most important developments in labour law in recent memory. These events shed light on employee voice issues, and on the continuing viability of the “Wagner Act” model. While declining union density rates in the private sector have prompted some to question this model, high-density rates in the public sector show that unions can flourish under it. This article gives an overview of public-sector unions in the US and summarizes the recent attacks on their rights. It then addresses rulings in both Missouri and Canada that found constitutional rights to collective bargaining, decisions that leave those rights intriguingly undefined. It concludes that advocates of employee voice should understand that, in the current political climate, those unsympathetic to employee voice will have significant clout in developing alternatives to the Wagner Act model.

Keywords: labor law, public-sector labor law, comparative Canadian U.S. law, Wagner Act, collective bargaining

Suggested Citation

Slater, Joseph E., Attacks on Public-Sector Bargaining as Attacks on Employee Voice: A (Partial) Defence of the Wagner Act Model (September 1, 2013). 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 875 (2013), University of Toledo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466032

Joseph E. Slater (Contact Author)

University of Toledo College of Law ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://law.utoledo.edu/faculty/Slater.html

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