The Rule of One-Third

30 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2000

See all articles by Rick Geddes

Rick Geddes

Cornell University - Department of Policy Analysis & Management (PAM)

Paul J. Zak

Claremont Graduate University - Center for Neuroeconomics Studies

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 18, 2000

Abstract

The Rule of One-Third guaranteed wives one-third of their husband's estate upon marital dissolution through death or divorce. We document the historical ubiquity of this legal construct and show that without a wife's residual claim on her husband's estate, children's outcomes are imperiled. Using ancient Roman law as an example, we argue that the patriarch, or paterfamilias, is the main legal entity with an interest in creating and enforcing the Rule of One-Third. Then, in a game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that the Rule of One-Third obtains when mothers' and fathers' marginal impacts on their children's human capital are equal. We conclude that the Rule of One-Third arose in many societies because it places the cost of marital dissolution on the household rather than society and solves a contracting problem between the husband and wife when each is specialized in tasks the other cannot perform well.

JEL Classification: J12, K00

Suggested Citation

Geddes, Rick and Zak, Paul J., The Rule of One-Third (October 18, 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=247251 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.247251

Rick Geddes

Cornell University - Department of Policy Analysis & Management (PAM) ( email )

120 Martha Van Rensselaer Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Paul J. Zak (Contact Author)

Claremont Graduate University - Center for Neuroeconomics Studies ( email )

160 E. 10th St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6165
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
122
Abstract Views
1,825
Rank
418,016
PlumX Metrics