How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption
Discussion Paper Series, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy, University of Freiburg, No. 2014-02
11 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2014
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How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption
Date Written: August 11, 2014
Abstract
Large-scale land acquisitions, or "land grabs", concentrate in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendly setting caused by a weak institutional framework. We argue that corrupt elites exploit this given institutional set-up to strike deals with international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 157 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that these land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption.
Keywords: Large-scale land acquisitions, land grabbing, foreign investments, weak institutions, property rights, corruption, large-N study
JEL Classification: F21, O13, Q15, Q34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation