The Puzzle of Purges: A New Theory of Judicial Manipulation with Evidence from Latin America

37 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2014

Date Written: August 15, 2014

Abstract

This paper extends the logic of offensive strikes to develop a new strategic theory of judicial manipulation. In contrast to standard insulation accounts, I argue that irregular transfers of power lead politicians to violate judicial independence, not shore it up. The paper examines nine hypotheses related to the theory using a novel dataset on judicial crises across eighteen Latin American countries between 1985 and 2008. Following the first strike logic, I show that variation in judicial crises is systematically related to the president’s risk of instability and to the costs he bears for launching such attacks, as captured by presidential powers, timing within the presidential term, the history of past presidential instability, confidence in the judiciary, and the age of the president’s party. Along the way, I rule out alternative hypotheses related to divided government and tit-for-tat norms. The conclusion explores the broader implications of my argument for institutional instability, judicial independence, and judicial decision-making.

Keywords: Judicial Independence, Institutional Instability, Latin America

Suggested Citation

Helmke, Gretchen, The Puzzle of Purges: A New Theory of Judicial Manipulation with Evidence from Latin America (August 15, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2481064 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2481064

Gretchen Helmke (Contact Author)

University of Rochester ( email )

300 Crittenden Blvd.
Rochester, NY 14627
United States

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