Regulating Access to International Large-Value Payment Systems
44 Pages Posted: 31 Dec 2000
Date Written: June 2000
Abstract
This paper studies access regulation to international large-value payment systems when banking supervision is national task. We focus on the choice between net settlement or imposing real time gross settlement. As a novel feature, the communication between the supervisors is endogenized. It is shown that the national supervisors' preferences regarding the settlement method are not perfectly aligned. As a result, systemic risk is excessive under public regulation. Still, leaving access regulation to the private banks can only be optimal if they have superior information about the risk of their foreign counterparty in the settlement system.
Keywords: Large-value Payment Systems, Regulation, Supervision, Systemic Risk
JEL Classification: E58, G20, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?
-
Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?
-
Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking
By Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White
-
Cooperation in International Banking Supervision
By Cornelia Holthausen and Thomas Rønde
-
European Banking, Past, Present and Future
By Jean Dermine
-
Cooperation in International Banking Supervision
By Cornelia Holthausen and Thomas Rønde
-
European Banking Integration: Don't Put the Cart Before the Horse
By Jean Dermine
-
Regulation of Multinational Banks: A Theoretical Inquiry
By Giacomo Calzolari and Gyongyi Loranth
-
Regulation of Multinational Banks: A Theoretical Inquiry
By Giacomo Calzolari and Gyongyi Loranth