Merger Control on Two-Sided Markets: Is There Need for an Efficiency Defense?
28 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2014
Date Written: September 30, 2014
Abstract
We study horizontal mergers on two-sided markets between horizontally differentiated platforms. We provide a theoretical analysis of the merger’s price effect based on the amount of cost savings it generates, the behavior of outsider platforms, and the size of cross-group network effects. We point out differences as compared with the standard, one-sided merger analysis, and also discuss the merger control policy implications.
Keywords: horizontal merger, two-sided markets, cost savings, merger control
JEL Classification: L41, D82, K21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Baranes, Edmond and Cortade, Thomas and Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea, Merger Control on Two-Sided Markets: Is There Need for an Efficiency Defense? (September 30, 2014). NET Institute Working Paper No. 14-12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2506359 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2506359
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.