Constitutional Complexities of European Democracy in Light of the 2014 European Parliament Elections

Abstract

The paper analyzes constitutional complexities of the most recent attempt to build direct democracy in the EU: the shift from a politically neutral European Commission to a Commission whose President is nominated by the political party that wins most seats in the elections to the European Parliament. In the course of the 2014 EP elections, the main European political parties nominated their candidates for president of the European Commission (the so-called Spitzenkandidaten) with the promise and the expectation that this linking of Presidency of the Commission with the outcome of EP elections would increase democratic legitimacy of Europe. This nomination procedure was followed through despite an express negative vote by two Member States; the new European Commission is currently being formed. This article examines the constitutional aspects of the new arrangement and discusses how they link to legitimacy of the EU and its policies. It is argued that the current Union Treaties situate legitimacy at the national rather than EU level, making the Spitzenkandidaten arrangement not only useless for enhancing legitimacy but directly harmful in this regard. An alternative solution for enhancing democratic legitimacy in the Union is offered. This solution lies with the European Parliament: only real policy-setting powers of the EP could shift the policy-setting power from national level to the EU. Accountability without power obscures democratic legitimacy further.

Keywords: European Union, EU Law, European Constitutional Law, European Institutions, European Parliament, European Commission, Politicization of European Commission