Enhancing the Efficiency of and Equity in Transplant Organ Allocation via Incentivized Exchange
59 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2015 Last revised: 20 Jan 2015
Date Written: January 17, 2015
Abstract
Within the last decade kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase the number of kidney transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and the full benefit from exchange can be realized only if they do participate. In this paper, we propose a new incentive scheme that relies on incentivizing participation of compatible pairs in exchange via insurance for the patient for a future renal failure. Efficiency and equity analyses of this scheme are conducted and compared with efficiency and equity outcomes of live donation and living donor organ exchange. We also present the potential role of such an incentive scheme to strengthen the national kidney exchange system.
Keywords: Market design, organ allocation, kidney exchange, equity, efficiency, compatible pairs
JEL Classification: D47, C78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation