Enhancing the Efficiency of and Equity in Transplant Organ Allocation via Incentivized Exchange

59 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2015 Last revised: 20 Jan 2015

See all articles by Tayfun Sonmez

Tayfun Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 17, 2015

Abstract

Within the last decade kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase the number of kidney transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and the full benefit from exchange can be realized only if they do participate. In this paper, we propose a new incentive scheme that relies on incentivizing participation of compatible pairs in exchange via insurance for the patient for a future renal failure. Efficiency and equity analyses of this scheme are conducted and compared with efficiency and equity outcomes of live donation and living donor organ exchange. We also present the potential role of such an incentive scheme to strengthen the national kidney exchange system.

Keywords: Market design, organ allocation, kidney exchange, equity, efficiency, compatible pairs

JEL Classification: D47, C78

Suggested Citation

Sonmez, Tayfun Oguz and Ünver, M. Utku, Enhancing the Efficiency of and Equity in Transplant Organ Allocation via Incentivized Exchange (January 17, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2551344 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2551344

Tayfun Oguz Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

M. Utku Ünver (Contact Author)

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.bc.edu/utku-unver

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