Regulatory Autonomy Constraints from GATS’ Unconditional Obligations: The Case of the European Union

Policy Research Centre on Foreign Affairs, International Entrepreneurship and Development Cooperation for the Government of Flanders, Paper 12

79 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2014 Last revised: 28 Jan 2015

See all articles by Bregt Natens

Bregt Natens

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies

Jan Wouters

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 1, 2014

Abstract

In this report, the inherent tension between regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation is addressed with a focus on trade in services. Therefore, this report examines in detail what is meant by the term ‘(constraints on) regulatory autonomy’ in trade law literature and develops five dimensions of the term: (i) endogenous and exogenous regulatory autonomy, (ii) regulatory autonomy related to the interest which a measure aims to advance, (iii) macro level constraints stemming from trade agreements, (iv) regulatory autonomy concerns resulting from the three steps of establishing a trade law violation, and (v) constraints related to the nature of the obligation. Subsequently, this report addresses how, in the case of the European Union, GATS’ unconditional obligations constrain regulatory autonomy. Aside from the Most-Favoured-Nation obligation, we address a series of obligations related to transparency. Our preliminary conclusions reflect the partial nature of this report, but already highlight that these unconditional obligations contain a few possibly problematic constraints on regulatory autonomy.

Keywords: WTO, World Trade Organization, GATS, General Agreement on Trade in Services, services, general obligations, MFN, most-favoured-nation treatment, monopolies, transparency, legal remedies

Suggested Citation

Natens, Bregt and Wouters, Jan, Regulatory Autonomy Constraints from GATS’ Unconditional Obligations: The Case of the European Union (March 1, 2014). Policy Research Centre on Foreign Affairs, International Entrepreneurship and Development Cooperation for the Government of Flanders, Paper 12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2406944 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406944

Bregt Natens

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies ( email )

Charles Deberiotstraat 34
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Jan Wouters (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies ( email )

House De Dorlodot - Deberiotstraat 34
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.globalgovernancestudies.eu

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