When Do Legislators Represent Their Constituents? Evidence from Roll-Call and Referendum Votes

Abstract

This paper develops a measure of representation that uses referendum returns to capture constituent opinion, and applies it to 4,094 roll-call votes on 32 laws in nine states. Roll-call votes were congruent with majority/median opinion in a district 66 percent of the time overall. Roll-call votes can be explained to a considerable degree by legislator ideology, with constituent opinion of secondary importance. The data show no reliable connection between congruence and competitive elections, term limits, media attention, and campaign contributions. Some noncongruent voting can be traced to party pressure, but those votes appear to be special cases. Taken as a whole, the evidence is broadly consistent with the theory that elections induce representation by selecting legislators that share constituent and preferences, and not by creating re-election pressure. I also find that noncongruent roll-call voting was disproportionately “biased” in the progressive direction.

Keywords: Representation, legislators, roll-call votes, accountability, referendums

JEL Classification: D72