Tacit Collusion in Repeated Contests with Noise
11 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2015
Date Written: July 17, 2015
Abstract
We analyze the determinants of tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated contest with noise in the contest success function. Sustaining collusion via Nash reversion strategies is easier the more noise there is, and is more difficult the larger is the contest's prize value. An increase in the contest's number of players can make sustaining collusion either more or less difficult.
Keywords: Contest, Conflict, Collusion, Noise.
JEL Classification: C72, C73, D72, D74.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Boudreau, James and Shunda, Nicholas, Tacit Collusion in Repeated Contests with Noise (July 17, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2632707 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2632707
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.