Popularity and Power: The Political Logic of Anticorruption in Authoritarian Regimes

34 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2015 Last revised: 28 Jun 2017

See all articles by Junyan Jiang

Junyan Jiang

Columbia University

Yan Xu

University of Chicago - Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 9, 2015

Abstract

Forceful anticorruption campaigns are common in authoritarian regimes but systematic evidence on how they actually work remains limited. We develop predictions about the patterns of enforcement based on the two fundamental challenges faced by autocrats: (1) containing mass discontent from below and (2) eliminating challengers within the elites. We test these predictions using both aggregate enforcement data (1988-2014), and a new dataset that tracks the political fates of over 3000 Chinese officials from 2000 to 2015. We find that the overall intensity of anticorruption is inversely related to the regime's economic performance, and individual-level investigations systematically shun away from clients of incumbent leaders while disproportionately targeting those affiliated with incumbents' rivals. Additional tests suggest that the discrepancy in enforcement cannot be explained by differential corruptness alone. Finally, we find that the recent anticorruption initiatives by Xi Jinping has led to a significant centralization of power within a smaller inner circle.

Keywords: anticorruption, comparative politics, authoritarian regime, China, patronage

Suggested Citation

Jiang, Junyan and Xu, Yan, Popularity and Power: The Political Logic of Anticorruption in Authoritarian Regimes (August 9, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2641567 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2641567

Junyan Jiang (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg.
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

Yan Xu

University of Chicago - Department of Political Science ( email )

Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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