Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 733-769, Fall 2010

36 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2005 Last revised: 14 Oct 2015

See all articles by Florian Ederer

Florian Ederer

Boston University - Markets, Public Policy, and Law; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: June 2009

Abstract

We investigate the choice to conduct interim performance evaluations in a dynamic tournament. When a worker's ability does not influence the marginal benefit of effort, the choice depends on the shape of the cost of effort function. When effort and ability are complementary, feedback has several competing effects: it informs workers about their relative position in the tournament (evaluation effect) as well as their relative productivity (motivation effect) and it creates signal-jamming incentives to exert effort prior to the performance evaluation. These effects suggest a trade-off of performance feedback between evaluation and motivation which is in accordance with organizational behavior research and performance appraisal practices.

Keywords: Feedback, Motivation, Tournaments, Interim Evaluation

JEL Classification: M12, M51

Suggested Citation

Ederer, Florian, Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments (June 2009). Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 733-769, Fall 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=691384 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.691384

Florian Ederer (Contact Author)

Boston University - Markets, Public Policy, and Law ( email )

Boston, MA
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
544
Abstract Views
4,953
Rank
93,734
PlumX Metrics