Revisiting the Penalty Rule

Bar News: The Journal of the New South Wales Bar Association, Summer 2015

U. of Adelaide Law Research Paper No. 2016-04

4 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2016

See all articles by John Eldridge

John Eldridge

The University of Sydney - Faculty of Law

Date Written: December 1, 2015

Abstract

John Eldridge reports on Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi; ParkingEye Limited v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67.

In Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi; ParkingEye Limited v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom engaged in an extensive review of the rule against penalties (‘the penalty rule’). In declining to extend the penalty rule beyond provisions which, as a matter of substance, provide for the consequences of a breach of contract, the Supreme Court opted not to follow the approach taken in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2012) 247 CLR 205 (Andrews).

The court also revisited the classic statement of law of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, where his Lordship framed the inquiry as turning upon the distinction between a penalty and a genuine pre-estimate of loss. The Supreme Court cautioned against permitting this distinction to obscure the true test, which was said to be whether the impugned clause imposes on the party in breach consequences which are out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the other party in the contract’s enforcement.

Keywords: penalty rule

JEL Classification: K40

Suggested Citation

Eldridge, John, Revisiting the Penalty Rule (December 1, 2015). Bar News: The Journal of the New South Wales Bar Association, Summer 2015, U. of Adelaide Law Research Paper No. 2016-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2730987

John Eldridge (Contact Author)

The University of Sydney - Faculty of Law ( email )

New Law Building, F10
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia

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