EC–Seal Products: A New Baseline for Global Economic Governance and National Regulatory Autonomy Debate in the Multilateral Trading System

33 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2016 Last revised: 6 May 2016

See all articles by Ming Du

Ming Du

Durham Law School

Kong Qingjiang

China University of Political Science and Law

Date Written: April 2, 2016

Abstract

One perpetual puzzle of international trade law is how to strike a proper balance between preventing trade protectionism and giving adequate policy space for states to pursue legitimate national policy goals. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the inherent tension between global trade governance and national regulatory autonomy should not be viewed as static, but should be constantly assessed in light of the new WTO jurisprudence. The most recent example is the landmark EC–Seal Products dispute in which the Appellate Body has clarified, or more accurately reversed, some well-established interpretations of some key concepts in the WTO law, and set a new baseline for the global trade governance and national regulatory autonomy debate in the multilateral trading system. We further submit that any ensuing debate must take place in light of the new rough consensus on what WTO disciplines require of WTO Members after EC–Seal Products.

Keywords: WTO, EC-Seal Products, Article XX, National Regulatory Autonomy

Suggested Citation

Du, Ming and Qingjiang, Kong, EC–Seal Products: A New Baseline for Global Economic Governance and National Regulatory Autonomy Debate in the Multilateral Trading System (April 2, 2016). Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2016, at 2 - 21. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727871

Ming Du

Durham Law School ( email )

Palatine Centre
Stockton Road
Durham, Durham DH1 3LE
United Kingdom

Kong Qingjiang (Contact Author)

China University of Political Science and Law ( email )

25 Xitucheng Road
Beijing, Beijing 100088
China

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