Do Higher Corporate Taxes Reduce Wages? Micro Evidence from Germany

80 Pages Posted: 2 Mar 2016

See all articles by Clemens Fuest

Clemens Fuest

ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich; Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich; Center for Economic Studies (CES)

Andreas Peichl

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; University of Mannheim - School of Economics (VWL); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; University of Essex - Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Sebastian Siegloch

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Corporate Taxation and Public Finance Research; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University of Cologne - Cologne Centre for Public Economics (CPE)

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Date Written: December 2015

Abstract

This paper estimates the incidence of corporate taxes on wages using a 20-year panel of German municipalities. Administrative linked employer-employee data allows estimating heterogeneous worker and firm effects. We set up a general theoretical framework showing that corporate taxes can have a negative effect on wages in various labor market models. Using an event study design, we test the predictions of the theory. Our results indicate that workers bear about 40% of the total tax burden. Empirically, we confirm the importance of both labor market institutions and profit shifting possibilities for the incidence of corporate taxes on wages.

Keywords: business tax, wage incidence, administrative data, local taxation

JEL Classification: H2, H7, J3

Suggested Citation

Fuest, Clemens and Peichl, Andreas and Siegloch, Sebastian, Do Higher Corporate Taxes Reduce Wages? Micro Evidence from Germany (December 2015). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 16-003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739611 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2739611

Clemens Fuest (Contact Author)

ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich ( email )

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Munich, DE 81679
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Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich ( email )

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Germany

Center for Economic Studies (CES) ( email )

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Andreas Peichl

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
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D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

University of Mannheim - School of Economics (VWL) ( email )

Mannheim 68131
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

University of Essex - Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

Sebastian Siegloch

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Corporate Taxation and Public Finance Research ( email )

United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Cologne - Cologne Centre for Public Economics (CPE) ( email )

Germany

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