Managerial Monitoring and Discrimination with Intertemporal Optimization

Catholic University of Brasilia Working Paper

11 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2001

Date Written: May 2001

Abstract

In this paper we develop a model that incorporates the managers' ability and the observed productivity of a worker in a firm's profit function. In that way, the loss of efficiency yielded by the presence of discrimination is compensated for. The model demonstrates that a number of workers with different productivities earns the same wages, which also indicates a form of discrimination.

Keywords: Discrimination, managers, monitoring, productivity and wages

JEL Classification: J71, D82

Suggested Citation

Loureiro, Paulo R. A., Managerial Monitoring and Discrimination with Intertemporal Optimization (May 2001). Catholic University of Brasilia Working Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=274321 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.274321

Paulo R. A. Loureiro (Contact Author)

University of Brasília- UnB ( email )

Campus Darcy Ribeiro-Asa Norte 70362-010 - Brasil
Brasilia, DF 70362-010
Brazil

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/praloureiro/

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
52
Abstract Views
1,011
Rank
687,751
PlumX Metrics