Managerial Monitoring and Discrimination with Intertemporal Optimization
Catholic University of Brasilia Working Paper
11 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2001
Date Written: May 2001
Abstract
In this paper we develop a model that incorporates the managers' ability and the observed productivity of a worker in a firm's profit function. In that way, the loss of efficiency yielded by the presence of discrimination is compensated for. The model demonstrates that a number of workers with different productivities earns the same wages, which also indicates a form of discrimination.
Keywords: Discrimination, managers, monitoring, productivity and wages
JEL Classification: J71, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Loureiro, Paulo R. A., Managerial Monitoring and Discrimination with Intertemporal Optimization (May 2001). Catholic University of Brasilia Working Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=274321 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.274321
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