Going from Buyers to Suppliers: Reverse-Engineering and the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles

Abstract

Short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) are the gateway weapon for states that have a demand for something as simple as a reliable and cheap replacement for fighter and bomber aircraft, all the way to states that are eyeing the ultimate prize; a nuclear deterrent. By importing SRBMs these states are not only gaining a useful weapon, they are gaining the tools to reverse engineer advanced technology, and use it as a building block for their own domestic production. These states can then become illicit suppliers of such technology and also threaten regional and international security. Despite this, SRBMs fall under the export thresholds set by the MTCR, and are frequently exported by numerous states, including the US. Though the tactical and strategic uses of SRBMs has received some attention by the broader ballistic missile proliferation literature and policy work, the larger problem of reverse engineering, and its role in the proliferation of more advanced missiles has received little to no attention. This study utilizes Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to explore the factors that, according to the broader proliferation and security literature, should play a role in a state reverse engineering SRBM technology.

Keywords: Proliferation