Equilibrium Characterization in Large Anonymous Games
University of Mannheim Working Paper
9 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2001
Date Written: August 9, 2001
Abstract
In this article I characterize Nash equilibria of large anonymous games by providing the following necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium distribution. For no subset K of actions more players play actions in K than have a best response in K to the given distribution. While neccessity is trivial the proof for sufficiency relies on a theorem by Bollobas-Varopoulos (1974) which is an extension of Hall's theorem or the marriage lemma well known from graph theory.
Keywords: large games, anonymous games, characterization, Hall's theorem
JEL Classification: C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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