State, Religiosity and Church Participation

Abstract

While most of the western world has faced a rapid process of secularization over recent generations, many other countries, especially in Latin America and the Muslim world, have maintained high levels of religiosity. Here, I propose a model of intergenerational transmission of religious values and competition between the state and the church that links changes in state efficiency to this dynamics. I show how, if the state becomes more efficient, agents vote for a higher size of the state. As the size of the state increases participation in church activities decreases and the next generation becomes less religious reinforcing the effect of the initial increase in the efficiency of the state. Because of this mechanism agents may have incentives to destroy part of the efficiency of the state in order to favor the church. I then provide some empirical evidence of this mechanism and show how it is only present for services provided by the state that are in direct competition with the church.

Keywords: welfare state, religion, secularization, voting, state efficiency, global game

JEL Classification: D72 H11 H53 P16 Z12