Download This PaperThe Coalition Structure Core is Accessible
7 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2001
Date Written: October 2001
Abstract
For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation-which we call enforceable dominance-is employed.
Keywords: Coalition structure, core-extension, non-emptiness, dominance
JEL Classification: C71, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Koczy, Laszlo A. and Lauwers, Luc, The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (October 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=286034 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286034
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