U.S. SPACs with a Focus on China

Journal of Multinational Financial Management, DOI: 10.1016/j.mulfin.2016.12.001, Forthcoming

46 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2014 Last revised: 20 Nov 2020

See all articles by Yochanan Shachmurove

Yochanan Shachmurove

City University of New York, CUNY City College of New York - Department of Economics; The University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Milos Vulanovic

EDHEC Business School

Date Written: October 7, 2014

Abstract

This paper examines the value implications of remedial actions taken by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) during 2011 that culminated in delisting a number of Chinese companies from United States public exchanges. To achieve that we examine the institutional characteristics and performance of Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) used as a financing tool and gateway to the U.S. capital markets by Chinese companies in period 2004-2011. Evidence shows that SPACs merging with companies from China are not inferior in corporate structure when compared with other SPACs. While their institutional characteristics are similar, the performance tests indicate that Chinese SPACs lose value around SEC decision dates, but in overall they outperform other SPACs listed in the U.S.

Keywords: Blank Checks, China, Chinese Reverse Mergers, Event Study, Muddy Waters Research, M&A, SEC, SPAC, Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G24, G30, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Shachmurove, Yochanan and Vulanovic, Milos, U.S. SPACs with a Focus on China (October 7, 2014). Journal of Multinational Financial Management, DOI: 10.1016/j.mulfin.2016.12.001, Forthcoming , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2392982 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2392982

Yochanan Shachmurove

City University of New York, CUNY City College of New York - Department of Economics ( email )

160 Convent Avenue
New York, NY 10031
United States
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The University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
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Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-1090 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

Milos Vulanovic (Contact Author)

EDHEC Business School ( email )

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CS 50411
Roubaix, 59057
France

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