Tax Avoidance and Overinvestment: The Role of the Information Environment

56 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2017

See all articles by Joseph Comprix

Joseph Comprix

Syracuse University

MingMing Feng

Oklahoma State University - Stillwater

Joohyung Ha

University of San Francisco - School of Management

Tony Kang

University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Date Written: February 1, 2017

Abstract

We investigate whether tax avoidance is associated with overinvestment and whether the firm’s information environment moderates this association. We find that tax avoidance is positively associated with overinvestment, and having a richer information environment mitigates this association. Our results are robust across multiple measures of tax avoidance and multiple proxies for the quality of the information environment. In addition, our results hold after propensity score matching, controlling for governance, partitioning on managerial ability, and in a change analysis. These findings highlight the important role of financial information in corporate investment behavior and enhance our understanding of the link between tax avoidance and agency costs.

Keywords: Overinvestment, Information Environment, Tax Avoidance

JEL Classification: E22, G31, M41, O16

Suggested Citation

Comprix, Joseph and Feng, MingMing and Ha, Joohyung and Kang, Tony, Tax Avoidance and Overinvestment: The Role of the Information Environment (February 1, 2017). Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2017 Conference, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2910080

Joseph Comprix

Syracuse University ( email )

Whitman School of Management
721 University Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13244-2450
United States
315-443-3674 (Phone)
315-442-1461 (Fax)

MingMing Feng

Oklahoma State University - Stillwater ( email )

Stillwater, OK 74078-0555
United States
405-744-1680 (Fax)

Joohyung Ha (Contact Author)

University of San Francisco - School of Management ( email )

San Francisco, CA 94117
United States

Tony Kang

University of Nebraska - Lincoln ( email )

307 College of Business Administration
Lincoln, NE 68588-0488
United States

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