Foreign Affairs Federalism and the Separation of Powers

9 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2001

See all articles by John Yoo

John Yoo

University of California at Berkeley School of Law; American Enterprise Institute; Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

Abstract

This essay argues that Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council may not portend a more aggressive intervention by the federal courts in enforcing a federal common law of foreign relations. A significant concern that underlies foreign affairs preemption is concern that 50 states might undermine the sole voice of the federal government in representing the nation. This concern, however, applies equally to the federal courts, which are not structurally suited due to their slowness and decentralization for involvement in foreign affairs. Enhancing the effectiveness of foreign policy calls for a reduced role for the judiciary in favor of the concentration of authority in the political branches.

Suggested Citation

Yoo, John, Foreign Affairs Federalism and the Separation of Powers. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=291160 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.291160

John Yoo (Contact Author)

University of California at Berkeley School of Law ( email )

Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-600-3217 (Phone)
510-643-2673 (Fax)

American Enterprise Institute ( email )

1789 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.hoover.org/profiles/john-yoo

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
217
Abstract Views
1,716
Rank
257,066
PlumX Metrics