Monetary Regime Choice in China: Policy Rules for Navigating in Dark Corners

19 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2017

See all articles by Hongyi Chen

Hongyi Chen

Hong Kong Monetary Authority - Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research (HKIMR)

Paul D. McNelis

Fordham University - Gabelli School of Business

Date Written: January 2017

Abstract

This paper examines the performance of monetary policy rules when the economy finds itself in dark corners. An economic dark corner can occur when the real sector experiences a sequence of negative shocks from world demand, while the central bank faces prolonged low world interest rates on its foreign reserve holdings. We examine variations of the current policy rules, based on variations of the Taylor rule with interest-rate instruments, in the context of strong restrictions on capital flows and a fixed exchange rate, and in the context of less restricted capital flows and a more flexible managed exchange rate. Our results show that a more flexible exchange-rate system with a more open capital account acts as a shock absorber when the economy is in a “dark corner”, thus reducing the fall in real GDP and consumption. However, this benefit comes at a cost. Under the more flexible exchange-rate regime with the more open capital account, during dark corner episodes, employment is much lower than in the more restricted fixed-rate environment. In the more open environment, the real exchange rate appreciates, with an increase in imported inputs, leading to a large loss of foreign exchange reserves and lower employment.

Keywords: Dark corners, regime choice

JEL Classification: E42, F41

Suggested Citation

Chen, Hongyi and McNelis, Paul D., Monetary Regime Choice in China: Policy Rules for Navigating in Dark Corners (January 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913561 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2913561

Hongyi Chen

Hong Kong Monetary Authority - Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research (HKIMR) ( email )

3 Garden Road, 8th Floor
Hong Kong
China

Paul D. McNelis (Contact Author)

Fordham University - Gabelli School of Business ( email )

113 West 60th Street
Bronx, NY 10458
United States

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