An Investigation of Weak-Veto Rules in Preference Aggregation
University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 363
27 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2017
Date Written: January 2017
Abstract
A new class of preference-aggregation rules is proposed, weak-veto rules. Weak-veto rules are applicable in settings characterized by strong pre-existing views on the desirability of different outcomes, whose recommendations should be modified only in the presence of strenuous opposition. They are characterized by strategy-proofness, strong efficiency, and unanimity-basedness. When non-manipulability requirements are strengthened to K-strategy-proofness, the positive results are weakened, except for the case of three alternatives and a sub-class of weak-veto rules based on Kemeny distances. This demonstrates the compatibility of stronger efficiency and non-manipulability properties for the three alternative model.
Keywords: social choice, preference aggregation, strategy-proofness, weak-veto rules
JEL Classification: D71, C70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation