Comprehensive Rationalizability
35 Pages Posted: 3 May 2017
Date Written: April 17, 2017
Abstract
We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies "common cautious belief in rationality" based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications.
Keywords: Common assumption of rationality, common belief in rationality, iterated admissibility, rationalizability, lexicographic belief systems
JEL Classification: C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Heifetz, Aviad and Meier, Martin and Schipper, Burkhard C., Comprehensive Rationalizability (April 17, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961934 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2961934
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